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COURT, CONGRESS AND TRADE BARRIERS
BRECK P. McALLISTER*
"I do not think the United States would come to an end
if we lost our power to declare an Act of Congress void. I
do think the Union would be imperiled if we could not make
that declaration as to the laws of the several States. For
one in my place sees how often a local policy prevails with
those who are not trained to national views and how often
action is taken that embodies what the Commerce Clause was
meant to end."---from a speech of Mr. Justice Holmes at a
dinner of the Harvard Law School Association of New York on
February 15, 1913, published in Speeches by Oliver Wendell
Holmes (1913) p. 98 at 102.
"Spasmodic and unrelated instances of litigation cannot
afford an adequate basis for the creation of integrated national
rules which alone can afford that full protection for interstate commerce intended by the Constitution. We would, therefore, leave the questions raised by the Arkansas tax for
consideration of Congress in a nation-wide survey of the constantly increasing barriers to trade among the States."--from
the joint dissent of Mr. Justice Black, Mr. Justice Frankfurter
and Mr. Justice Douglas in McCwrroll v. Dixie Greyhound
Lines, 309 U. S. 176, 189 (1940).

In our federal system we have one Congress, forty-eight

state legislatures and innumerable municipal and other local
legislative bodies. In this state of governmental affairs both
the Supreme Court and Congress, each in its own way, have
tried to play a part in the difficult task of resolving and

dissolving the inevitable clashes of power that have occurred
from time to time.

The excerpts quoted at the head of this

article reveal sharply divergent views as to the proper part
that each should play in this important task of government.
These two agencies are not, of course, the only ones that
may play some part in pouring oil on troubled legislative

waters, but they are the only two that will be discussed in
this article. Others will be treated elsewhere in this symposium.
The movement against state trade barrier laws brings
us at the outset to the question, what is meant by a trade
barrier law? One witness at the hearings before the Tem-

porary National Economic Committee on trade barriers said
* Professor of Law, University of Washington.

(144)

COURT, CONGRESS AND

TRADE BARRIERS

that a trade barrier was "the counterpart on the national
scene of a tariff wall in international trade."1 Another witness elaborated this same idea by describing it as "any state
statute or regulation which, on its face, or in practical effect,
tended to operate to the disadvantage of persons, products,
or services coming from sister States, to the advantage of
local residents, products and business." 2 There must then
be some discrimination-be it obvious or devious-against
goods from out of state, and it was pointed out that discrimination may be of two kinds. It may grow out of the statutes and regulations of one State or it may grow out of the
cumulative effect of the non-discriminatory diversity of the
laws of the several States. 3 These are obviously two very
different kinds of trade barriers and each must be dealt with
quite differently from the other.
These definitions assume the ideal of a great free trade
area in which our national economy may flourish without
let or hindrance from local legislators bent upon setting
themselves apart in economic isolation from those who live
and work in other states. When the time comes to approve
or condemn it must never be forgotten that all barriers have
two sides. They may be disagreeable to those who must
meet and overcome them if they can but they may be of
real importance to those who stand behind them.
The Supreme Court in its commerce clause opinions has
said many fine things about this ideal of a great free trade
area. Thus, in 1827 Chief Justice Marshall remarked that
"the oppressed and degraded state of commerce previous to
the adoption of the Constitution can scarcely be forgotten"
and he doubted "whether any of the evils proceeding from
the feebleness of the federal government contributed more
to that great revolution which introduced the present system,
than the deep and general conviction that commerce ought
to be regulated by Congress." 4 In 1940 Chief Justice Hughes
put it this way-"In confiding to Congress the power to
I Testimony submitted to the Temporary National Economic Committee
2

by Mr. Frank Bane, Executive Director, Council of State Governments (1940) 12 Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., 266.
Testimony submitted to the Temporary National Economic Committee
by Mr. A. H. Martin Jr. Executive Director, Marketing Laws Sur-

vey, W.P.A. (March 18, 1940), 12 Bureau National Affairs, Inc.,
282.
3Ibid.
4 Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, 445-446 (U. S. 1827).

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

regulate interstate commerce, the aim was to provide a free
national market,-to pull down and prevent the re-erection
of state barriers to the free intercourse between the people
of the States. That free intercourse was deemed, and has
proved, to be essential to our national economy. It should
not be impaired." 5 Statements of this sort abound in commerce clause opinions yet the ideal remains no more than
that. It is no reality and never has been. We have never
had "a free national market" or "free intercourse between
the people of the States." Our national economy has had to
grow as best it could amidst an "immense mass" 6 of state
and municipal legislation and legislation, too, that has met
with the approval of the Supreme Court.
The importance of this situation was amply demonstrated
in the fine work of Professor Melder, published in 1937.7 It
is confirmed in more recent studies.8 These studies reveal
situations that stand in sharp contrast to the fine ideal about
the freedom of our national economy. Three justices of the
Supreme Court have recently pointed out that the responsibility of the court is a limited one and that "the remedy,
if any is called for . . . is within the ample reach of Congress." 9 The Attorney General has doubted whether there
is much the Supreme Court can do about it, 1° and others have
said much the same thing. 1 If the views of the three dis5See McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U. S. 33, 59
(1940) (dissenting opinion).
6

The expression is that of Chief Justice Marshall in 1824 in Gibbons v.

7

See

Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 202 (U. S. 1824).
8

STATE AND LOCAL BARRIERS TO INTERSTATE COMMERCE IN THE UNITED

(University of Maine Studies, 2nd Series, No. 43, 1937).
See Taylor, Burtis, and Waugh, Barriers to Internal Trade in Farn
Products, A Special Report to the Secretary of Agriculture by the
Bureau of Agricultural Economics (U. S. Dept. Agric. March,
1939) ; Comparative Charts of State Statutes Illustrating Barriers
to Trade Between States by the Marketing Laws Survey, W. P. A.
(May, 1939); State Trade Barrier Hearings before the Temporary
National Economic Committee (March, 1940).
STATES

9 See the joint dissent of Mr. Justice Black, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and
Mr. Justice Douglas in McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, 309

U. S. 176, 183 (1940) and the quotation from this dissent at the

head of this article.
10 See the speech of Attorney General Jackson on The Supreme Court
and Interstate Barriers (Jan. 1940) 207 ANNALS 70.
n See the testimony of Mr. Frank Bane supra note 1, at 270. Professor
Elliott of the School of Government, Harvard University, at the
same hearings, cited supra note 1, at 481 points out that "the

Court refuses more and more to occupy the difficult role that it
has previously maintained

(with a few exceptions) of being an

umpire of the federal system in this much disputed area. It invites Congress to remedy the evil."
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senters in the McCarroll case should some day prevail over
those expressed by Mr. Justice Holmes in the quotation at
the head of this article then we will have to look for a new
umpire for our federal system. Congress or some other
agency will have to take up at whatever point the Supreme
Court decides to drop out.
Throughout our history the Supreme Court has never
been our only umpire. Court and Congress have each played
a part in promoting and striking down trade barriers. It is
impossible in an article of this length to pass the history
of our national commerce in review and discuss the work of
Court and Congress in terms of trade barriers. We can do no
more than sample how each has done its work. This may
reveal the aptitudes of each.

I
In some cases states have sought to erect insurmountable barriers-out and out prohibitions of trade in particular
goods. Liquor, oleomargarine and convict-made goods are
the examples that stand out. The Supreme Court quickly
recognized the power of the states to prohibit the sale of
liquor and oleomargarine 2 but in the face of this admission
it set up the original package doctrine of the commerce
clause, in the name of a freedom of trade that the states did
not want, to frustrate the effective operation of the state
statutes. 3 In this state of affairs Congress took a hand
and did its best to help the states keep their barriers high
and effective. 4 The Supreme Court would have saved itself
and Congress a lot of trouble if it had stuck by its views of
12 Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 18 Wall. 129 (U. S. 1874) (liquor); Mugler v.
Kansas, 123 U. S. 632 (1887) (liquor); Powell v. Pennsylvania,
127 U. S. 678 (1888) (oleomargarine).
13 Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100 (1890) (liquor). This was not always so, see the License Cases, 5 How. 504 (U. S. 1847). The
oleomargarine case is Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U. S. 1
(1898).
'14 The Wilson Act of 1890, 26 STAT. 313 sustained in In Te Rahrer, 140
U. S. 545 (1891) and the Webb-Kenyon Act of 1913, 37 STAT. 699700 sustained in Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Marlyand Ry., 242
U. S. 311 (1917). As to oleomargarine Congress acted in 1902 by
passing an Act modeled after the Wilson Act. 32 STAT. 193 (1890),
21 U. S. C. §23 (1934). At the same time it levied a tax of ten
cents a pound on colored oleomargarine and this was sustained in
McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27 (1904). The states may
levy prohibitive taxe.- too, A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U. S.
40 (1934).
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1847 in the License Cases's and had recognized that if a
state may prohibit trade in liquor and oleomargarine at home,
it should be free to protect its action from frustration through
goods from out of state. Some may say that the court struck
a blow for freedom of interstate trade but it was for a freedom that neither the states nor Congress wanted.
The foregoing prohibitory barriers are not discriminatory. All who would sell the proscribed liquor, oleomargarine
and, more recently, convict-made goods are hit alike. 6 It
is quite true that where there is no domestic manufacture
at all it is the out-of-state manufacturer who is barred from
the state unless he can get to market with a lawyer on the
commerce clause but the Supreme Court has never treated
this as having any significance. An oleomargarine statute
may seek to compel people to buy butter from the local dairy
by barring the competing product that is made out of state.
In this sense it hits directly at interstate commerce, but if
this was treated as significant it would prevent a state so
situated from passing any kind of a prohibitory law. The
discrimination against interstate commerce, if such it be,
must be overlooked, and it is.
As far as trade barriers go, our conclusion must be
that so far as Court and Congress are concerned the states
have ample power to do about as they please. The Supreme
Court even intimated in Whitfield v. Ohio'7 that the original
package doctrine was "more artificial than sound"' 8 and
that the states might erect barriers-against convict-made
goods at least-without any helping hand from Congress.
This is surely an invitation to try it. The only query that
remains is as to discriminatory state action.' 9 As a matter
of fact it is hard to see why any of these measures should
be condemned as trade barriers when they operate as flat
prohlibitions. At any rate there is no basis for condemning
them because of any lack of power to erect them.
15 5 How. 504 (U. S. 1847).
I This point was stressed by the Supreme Court in sustaining the convict-made goods federal consent statutes in Whitfield v. Ohio, 297
U. S. 431, 437 (1936) and Kentucky Whip and Collar Co. v. Illinois Central R. R., 299 U. S. 334, 351 (1937). On liquor see Scott v.
Donald, 165 U. S. 58, 100 (1897).
.7297 U. S.431 (1936).
18 Id. at 440.
19 The point is discussed in Strong, Cooperative Federalism (1938) 23
Iowa L. Rev. 455, 465-469.
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In another group of situations state power, if it was to
operate at all, might easily come into conflict with the laws
of another state. This was bound to be the case if states
were free to regulate interstate railroad rates and in 1886
the Supreme Court struck down such an effort and declared
that only Congress could do this.20 Congress accepted the
invitation the next year with the passage of the Interstate
Commerce Act. The confusion that might easily have grown
out of the diversities of state laws was averted. Buck v.
Kuykendal121 in 1925 did for interstate busses and trucks

what the Wabash case of 1886 did for interstate railroad
rates but the case was not so clear. There were caveats in
later cases. 22 At any rate Congress stepped in in 1935 with
the Motor Carrier Act 23 and took over, among other things,
the matter of issuing certificates of convenience and necessity for interstate routes and also some control over interstate rates. Again uniformity displaced diversity. The
story of the radio waves that know no state lines is much
the same. Radio must be controlled by Congress if it is to
exist at all.2 4 The airplane too flies interstate and Congress
again has written uniform rules. 25 In none of these cases
is state action excluded entirely. There are constant problems that grow out of real and supposed conflicts between
state statute and Act of Congress and between state statute
and commerce clause. These questions must be answered
28
by the courts.
2

o Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886). But
earlier the opposite view had been taken in Chicago & N.W. R.R. v.
Fuller, 17 Wall. 553 (U.S. 1873), Peik v. Chicago & N.W. R.R.,
94 U.S. 164 (1877).
21267 U.S. 307 (1925).
22 Bradley v. Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, 289 U.S. 92 (1933);
Interstate Busses Corp. v. Holyoke Street Ry. Co., 273 U.S. 45
(1927) ; Eichholz v. Public Service Commission, 306 U.S. 268 (1939).
2349 STAT. 543 (1935), 49 U.S.C. §301 (Supp. 1935). See Note (1936),
36 Col. L. Rev. 945.
24 Federal Radio Commission v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mtg. Co., 289
U.S. 266 (1933).
25 This began with the Air Commerce Act of 1926, 44 STAT. 568, 49
U.S.C. §171 and was enlarged in the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938,
52 STAT. 977, 49 U.S.C. §401 (Supp. 1938).
26 On railroads, see REYNOLDS, DISTRIBUTION OF POWER TO REGULATE INTERSTATE CARRIERS (1928); on busses and trucks, see Kauper, State
Regulation of Interstate Motor Carriers (1933) 31 Mich. L. Rev.
920, 1097; Note, Federal Motor CarrierAct (1936) 36 Col. L. Rev.
945; on radio, see Van Allen, State and Municipal Regulation of
Radio (1931) 1 J. Radio L. 35; on airplanes, see Tuttle and Bennett, Extent of Power of Congress over Aviation (1931) 5 U. of Cin.
L. Rev. 261; Newman, Aviation Law and the Constitution (1930)

39 Yale L. J. 1113.
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The point of all this as far as state trade barriers are
concerned is that the Supreme Court in the Wabash case
and again in Buck v. Kuykendall was laying down the policy
that in those cases no control was better than the diversities
and conflicts that would grow out of state control. It was
plain enough that there would be some control and in both
cases Congress accepted the judicial invitation. Against this
brief background the recent case of South CarolinaHighway
Dept. v. Barnwell Bros.27 stands in sharp contrast. In that
case a unanimous court sustained the validity of state weight
and width limitations on trucks against the claim that the
statute was in conflict with the federal Motor Carrier Act
and also with the commerce clause. The South Carolina
statute was not discriminatory but the court was ready to
admit that it burdened the interstate truck. This is one of
those situations in which the barrier to trade grows out
of the cumulative effect of the non-discriminatory diversity
of a large number of state laws. That the barriers are real
and serious is plain enough. The decision might be put down
as a judgment that the diversities and barriers that would
grow out of state control are better than no control at all
but the opinion of the court does not run along those lines.
The opinion runs along the line that the barriers may stand
until Congress sees fit to do something about them. It is
not a judicial function to strike down these barriers. "Courts
do not sit as Legislatures, either state or national. They
cannot act as Congress does when, after weighing all the
conflicting interests, state and national, it determines when
and how much the state regulatory power shall yield to the
larger interests of a national commerce."28 The court is apparently unwilling to strike any blow for the freedom of
interstate trucks and busses from these burdensome state
regulations. It is now said to be a legislative and not a
judicial function to strike it. The Supreme Court will no
longer act as umpire in this field. A new one must be found.
It is obvious that Congress will have to do the job.
II
We come now to an "immense mass" of statutes enacted
under the police power of the states. These deal with ani27303
28

Id.

U. S. 177 (1938).

at 190.
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mal and plant quarantines, milk and dairying, nursery stock,
food, drugs and cosmetics, weights and measures, grades,
standards and labels, public safety and all such. They are
broadly classified as measures to protect the public health,
safety and general welfare. Without going into any detailed analysis of the cases in each category, it is enough to
say that with rare exceptions the Supreme Court has sustained these laws against the claim that they were invalid
as direct burdens on interstate commerce. 2
Some of the
rare, though important, exceptions are found in cases where
the Supreme Court has detected some discrimination against
goods from out of state either in the terms of the statute
or in some masquerade.30 In the cases involving an inspection fee, the court has looked to see whether the amount of
the fee bore some proper relation to the cost of inspection.3 1
In this state of constitutional affairs it is plain enough
that if a lot of states pass laws of this kind and if each
has its own ideas as to what kind of a law should be passed,
the interstate distributor will find the road to market beset
with difficulties and expense. He may even find himself
barred entirely. His prayer will be that if there must be
such laws let them at least be uniform or nearly so. The
distributor who stays within his own state lines must meet
only one law and as to him it is uniform. The interstate
distributor has another prayer, too. Again, if there must
be such laws, let them at least operate equally against him
and the local distributor. He will seek to tear off the mas2 Many cases could be cited for this. For examples; Savage v. Jones,
225 U.S. 501 (1912) (food for animals); Patapsco Guano Co. v.
North Carolina, 171 U.S. 345 (1898) (fertilizer); Weigle v. Curtice
Bros., 248 U.S. 285 (1919) (prohibition of sale of food products
containing benzoate of soda); Corn Products Refining Co. v. Eddy,

249 U.S. 427 (1919) (formula. disclosure); McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115 (1913) (labelling); Bourjois v. Chapman, 301
U.S. 183 (1937) (cosmetics). Many milk cases are collected in Note
(1935) 3 Geo. Wash, L. Rev. 494. Many cases are collected in
GAVIT, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE

(1932) §142, 144-149.

3o Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313 (1890) (sale of fresh meat prohibited unless from animals inspected in the state within twentyfour hours before slaughter); Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U.S. 78

(1891) (sale of fresh meat slaughtered one hundred miles or more

from place of sale prohibited until inspected locally); Voight v.
Wright, 141 U.S. 62 (1891) (sale of flour brought into state pro-

hibited until inspected); Hale v. Bimco Trading, Inc., 306 U.S.
375 (1939) (inspection of cement imported from a foreign country).

31 Standard Oil Co. v. Graves, 249 U.S. 389 (1919); Phipps v. Cleveland

Refining Co., 261 U.S. 449 (1923); D. E. Foote & Co. v. Stanley,

232 U.S. 494 (1914).
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querade of health and the public weal and expose the state
law in all its economic sin as a barrier deliberately erected
to protect the home merchants and keep him out. He will
proclaim an unholy-and unconstitutional-alliance between
health and sin.
The Supreme Court has done little to answer these
prayers. It has found no way of making uniformity a requirement of constitutionality and it is hard to see how it
could do so. The import of this statement is that where
a barrier grows out of the cumulative effect of the non-discriminatory diversity of state laws there is nothing the Supreme Court can be expected to do to relieve the situation.
It has also been reluctant to detect economic sin except in
the rare cases already mentioned where masquerade has
32
not been attempted or is pretty obvious.
It is easy enough to say that where state laws have
created such a bog that the national distributor is unduly
burdened, Congress ought to take over the field and produce
order. But that is more easily said than done. The fact
is that Congress has seldom done this. More often than not,
it has simply added its law to the crowded field. From the
point of view of the national distributor, little is gained by
this but from the point of view of effective action by government--some government-the story is very different. Three
samples of federal action will make the position of Congress
clear.
In the field of food, drugs and now cosmetics, Congress
has made no move, beyond the passage of its laws, to exclude
state action. There were many state food and drug laws
33
on the books before the first federal act of 1906 was passed
and they have continued in effect. The new Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act of 193834 is simply a more effective attack
on the problem and, like its predecessor, contains nothing
designed to stop state action. On the contrary, like its predecessor, it may promote a further movement for state laws
patterned after it. It is quite true that considerable uniformity among state laws has been attained but this is a
matter of choice and not compulsion. Diversity to some
32 See Note 30 supra.
33 Strong, Cooperative Federalism (1938) 23 Iowa L. Rev. 459, 479-482;
Salthe, State Food, Drug & Cosmetic Legislation and its Administration (1939) 6 Law & Contemp. Prob. 165.
14 52 STAT. 1040 (1938), 21 U.S.C. §301 ff. (Supp. 1938).
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degree is bound to continue so long as all may stand on the
statute books. The federal law depends, of course, upon the
power of Congress over interstate commerce but in food
and drugs this may go to the point of retail sale. 5 There
may be conflict with state law at this and other points. If
there is, it is up to the Supreme Court to find it for it is
clear enough that conflict spells invalidity to state action.
The court has been reluctant to find it or to find that Congress has "occupied the field."38 It remains to be seen
whether it will be found in identical state and federal laws.37
But there is much to be said for the continuance of
state power. It would be a bold Congress that would at one
stroke supersede all state action as applied to goods that
move interstate. It has been a wise Supreme Court that
has been wary about finding conflict and invalidating state
statutes on that ground. Concurrent power makes for more
effective action by government and this is more important
than some diversity and the troubles for the national distributor that go with it.
The story of quarantines is a different one. Here again
the states may act but only within limits. A state cattle
quarantine, for example, was sustained against the argument
that it burdened interstate commerce3 8 but only on a showing that it was a "proper quarantine." "The prevention of
disease is the essence of a quarantine law," 39 the court said,
and thus distinguished an earlier case in which a quarantine
had been condemned as a burden because it was not so limited.40 These cases were decided before Congress stepped
into the field. Congress acted with respect to livstock in 1903
and 1905 and with respect to plants in 1912. A state quarantine on alfalfa was then declared invalid4 on the theory that
35 McDermott

36It

v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115 (1913).

was not found in Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501 (1912) or in
Weigle v. Curtice Bros., 248 U.S. 285 (1919), or in two more recent
cases, Kelly v. State of Washington, 302 U.S. 1 (1937) and H. P.
Welch Co. v. State of New Hampshire, 306 U.S. 79 (1939). Its discovery in McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115 (1913) sets this
case apart.
37 This point is discussed briefly by Professor David F. Cavers in a
comment on the new North Carolina Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act of
1939 in 17 N. C. L. Rev. 400, 414.
38 Smith v. St. Louis & S. W. R. Co., 181 U.S. 248 (1901).
39
Id. at 255.
40
Hannibal & St. J. R. R. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465 (1877).
41 Oregon-Washington R. & N. Co. v. Washington, 270 U.S. 87 (1926).
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Congress had taken over the field even though no federal
quarantine had been actually declared. This was a direct
blow at state power and for uniformity but Congress quickly
amended the federal act to make it perfectly clear that state
quarantines might stand until the federal government had
put one in operation.42
If quarantines are to be condemned as trade barriers
it is because they are perverted from their proper purpose
and are set up and used to gain economic ends. Health among
cattle and plants at home is surely an important matter
for any government. The Supreme Court once said that
"any pretense or masquerade will be disregarded, and the
true purpose of a statute ascertained, ' 4 3 and it sounded as
though the court would be quick to strike down a quarantine
that looked too much like an economic barrier, but Mintz v.
BaldwiW4 in 1933 has disspelled any such hope.4 5 The quoted
phrase refers only to "the true purpose of a statute" but the
"pretense and masquerade" are much more apt to occur in
some particular order issued under an impeccable statute.
The task of ferreting out the economic sin in what is set
before the court as a health order is not an easy one. It
may require choice among competing biological and health
claims. It will surely require a close scrutiny of the findings, if such there be, that support the order and even with
the best of will the court that finds its way through all this
may come out with the discovery that there is some economic
sin in every quarantine. How much should it permit? How
important is health when weighed against market protection?
The same alliance between health and economics is
shown just as vividly in the health and inspection measures
that did much to create the sheltered markets called milk
sheds that supply great consuming centers with fluid milk.
Courts have only rarely rooted out these tariff walls. The
sheds were created by cities and states in the name of
STAT. 250 (1926), 7 U.S.C. §161 (1934). This amendment was
passed about six weeks after the Supreme Court decision.
48 Smith v. St. Louis & S. W. R. R., 181 U.S. 248, 257 (1901).
4244

44 289 U.S. 346 (1933)
45 MELDER, STATE AND LOCAL BARRIERS TO INTERSTATE COMMERCE IN

THE

(University of Maine Studies, 2nd series No. 43,
(1937), 134-137 makes out a good case for the economic motivation
of the New York order involved in this case.
UNITED STATES

COURT, CONGRESS AND TRADE BARRIERS

155

health,46 but they were destroyed by the Supreme Court in
the name of economic sin when New York State sought to
project its price control throughout a milk shed that extended into other states.4 7 New York tried hard to convince
the court that its effort was "to make its inhabitants healthy
and not to make them rich" 48 but this time the court would
have none of such talk. The opinion of Mr. Justice Cardozo
is vibrant with an insistence that "one state in its dealings
with another may not place itself in a position of economic
isolation. Formulas and catchwords are subordinate to this
overmastering requirement," 49 and that "the peoples of the
several states must sink or swim together." 0O There was
no such fine talk when in the same year the Supreme Court
intimated that even without congressional aid the state of
Ohio might bar from its markets goods made by convict
labor in other statess1 or when two years later the court permitted South Carolina to bar from its highways interstate
trucks that did not conform to its weight and width requirements 2 or when, in another milk case, it permitted Pennsylvania to fix the price to be paid to a producer in that
state for milk to be shipped interstate to New York." Baldwin v. Seelig has made it impossible for any state with a
milk shed that extends into another state to engage in effective price control of milk but now health and economics
are once more happily reunited. This time they march
under a federal banner.5 4
In the case of interstate quarantines, it would, of course,

be within the power of Congress to take over the whole
business. The price of uniformity would be a destruction
of state power in this important field. Congress so far has
not been willing to take the step. Perhaps Congress felt, as
did Mr. Justice McReynolds and Mr. Justice Sutherland,
that these vital matters should not be left to "the slow char46 The story will be found in HAU'MITON, PRICE AND PRICE PoLICIs (1938)
461-474.
Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
48 Id. at 523.
49 Id at 527.
GOd. at 523.
- Whitfield v. Ohio, 297 U.S. 431 (1936).
47

52 South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S.

177 (1938).
53 Milk Control Board v. Eisenberg Farm Products, 306 U.S. 346 (1939).
5
4 United States v. Rock Royal Co-op. Inc., 307 U. S. 533 (1939)
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ity of a far-off and perhaps supine federal bureau." 5 At
any rate it has acted in that way. A compromise has been
proposed whereby the states would continue to issue their
orders but they would not become effective until approved
by the Secretary of Agriculture or at least should be subject
to his veto.5 6 There is much to be said in favor of this
kind of administrative policing of state quarantine orders.
The Secretary is apt to be a much better ferret than the
Supreme Court and the process of review and with it the
attainment of a greater degree of uniformity is much more
apt to be brought about by him than by the justices. Local
economic pressures are more likely to evaporate at Washington, D.C. than at the state capitol. This is not stuff for
the justices.
The story of laws dealing with weights, measures,
grades, labels and containers is different from either of the
others just considered. State power in this field is ample
and has never been seriously doubted.5 7 The commerce clause
has created no difficulty.58 Congress too has ample power.
Here, under its power to fix the standard of weights and measures,"551 it may fix standards for all dealings in a given commodity, both interstate and intrastate, while under the commerce clause it is limited, of course, to interstate commerce.
No argument is needed to show the desirability of uniformity
in laws of this kind. Transportation and refrigeration have
developed to the point where the market for agricultural
products has become national and it is with respect to these
products that these laws have had their greatest development.60 Congress has in many important instances taken
was badly
over the field and produced the uniformity that
2
61
tobacco.6 3
and
grain,
cotton,
with
so
done
has
It
needed.
55 See Oregon-Washington R. & N. Co. v. Washington, 270 U.S. 87,

103 (1926) (dissenting opinion).
See Taylor, Burtis, and Waugh, supra Note 8, at 96, 97.
57 Schmidinger v. Chicago, 226 U.S. 578 (1913) (weights and measures);
Hauge v. Chicago, 299 U.S. 387 (1937) (public weightmaster); Armour & Co. v. North Dakota, 240 U.S. 510 (1919) (containers) ;
Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176 (1935)
(containers); Peterson Baking Co. v. Bryan, 290 U.S. 570 (1934)
(standard sizes of loaves of bread) ; Corn Products Refining Co. v.
Eddy, 249 U.S. 427 (1919) (labels); Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266 U.S. 497 (1925) (labels).
58 Hauge v. Chicago, 299 U.S. 387 (1937).
59 U.S. CONST. ART. I, §8 (5).
60 Taylor, Burtis, and Waugh, supra Note 8, at 68-84.
56
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It has made a move in that direction with peanuts,6 4 fresh
fruits and vegetables,5 and wool, 68 and has set standards
for apples and pears destined for export.6 7 All of the foregoing were enacted under the commerce clause. The power
over weights and measures has been used to fix standard
sizes of barrels for apples, fruits and vegetables, and of
hampers, round stave baskets and splint baskets for fruits
and vegetables.68 Apparently only the commerce power was
used in the case of barrels for lime and certain ,types of
baskets for fruits and vegetables.69 In spite of these efforts
Congress has not taken over the whole field and state power
still exists in many instances.70 The road to uniformity
leads straight to Congress but in this case, unlike the others,
it is, a road that few will hesitate to recommend.
Ill
When we turn from the foregoing regulatory state statutes to state taxation-be it for revenue or regulation or both
-we come to a matter as to which Congress has done nothing
of importance today.71 The Supreme Court has been left to
United States Cotton Standards Act, 42 STAT. 1517 (1923), 7 U.S.C.
§51 (1934).
62 United States Grain Standards Act, 39 STAT. 482 (1916), 7 U.S.C.
§71 (1934).
r3 The Tobacco Inspection Act, 49 STAT. 735 (1935), 7 U.S.C. §511
(Supp. 1935).
61

64 49 STAT. 1898 (1936), 7
65 Perishable Agricultural

U.S.C. §954 (Supp. 1936).

Commodities Act, 46 STAT. 538 (1930),

7

U.S.C. §499N. (1934).
G645 STAT.

593 (1928), 7 U.S.C. §415 c. (1934).

6748 STAT. 123 (1933),
6837 STAT. 250 (1912),
60 37 STAT.

7 U.S.C. §581 (1934).
15 U.S.C. §§231-236, 257-257i (1934).

250 (1912), 15 U.S.C. §§237-242, 251-256 (1934).

70 See, for example, Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S.
71

176 (1935).
In an Act of May 31, 1870, 16 STAT. 144 (1870), 8 U.S.C.§135 (1934)
Congress declared that "no tax or charge shall be imposed or enforced by any State upon any person immigrating thereto from a
foreign country, which is not equally imposed and enforced upon
every person immigrating to such State from any foreign country." It was applied in In re Ah Fong, 3 Sawy 144, 1 Fed. Cas. No.
102, (C. C. Cal. 1874) but with such decisions as Henderson v. Wickham, 92 U.S. 259 (1876), Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1876),
and People v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 107 U.S. 59
(1883) in which non-discriminatory state taxes and other requirements were invalidated, the Act of 1870 is of no importance today.
Perhaps mention should be made of congressional action to permit
state taxation of national banks, see Rottschaefer, State Taxation
of National Bank Shares (1923) 7 Minn. L. Rev. 357.
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its own devices in policing state taxes that were challenged
under the commerce and due process clauses. In doing this
important job it has built up a great body of decisions. Those
dealing with the commerce clause were recently reviewed
and given a new twist in the Berwind-White case.7 2 It was
there said that "Forms of state taxation whose tendency
is to prohibit the commerce or place it at a disadvantage
as compared or in competition with intrastate commerce and
any state tax which discriminates against the commerce, are
familiar examples of the exercise of state taxing power in
an unconstitutional manner. ' 73 A large number of cases
were cited for this and it was said that they were predicated
on "a practical judgment as to the likelihood of the tax being
used to place interstate commerce at a competitive disadvantage" 74 and reference was made to "the recognized danger
that, to the extent that the burden ,falls on economic interests without the state, it is not likely to be alleviated by those
political restraints which are normally exerted on legislation
where it affects adversely interests within the state. ' 75 On
the other hand, it was made clear that interstate commerce
must pay its way and other groups of cases were cited to
show how states might tax even ,though the burden of the
tax "when distributed through the play of economic forces"
might affect interstate commerce.7 6 "Courts," it was said,
"are called upon to reconcile competing constitutional demands, that commerce between the states shall not be unduly impeded by state action, and that the power to lay taxes
for the support of state government shall not be unduly curtailed. '77 It is, then, duly against unduly and the Supreme
Court will call the turn when state taxing statutes come before it. This is obviously a difficult and important task and
it has been carried out with the aid of formulas that give
to the court a broad discretion.
Until recently this discretion has been exercised with a
faithful-perhaps too faithful-regard for the freedom of
interstate transactions from state taxes. In important instances the interstate sale enjoyed a competitive advantage
72 McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33 (1940).
73Id. at 45.
7-. Id. at 45.

75 Ibid.
76 Id. at 46.
77 Id. at 48.
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over the intrastate sale. But when the court sustained the
use tax in 193778 and a sales tax on an interstate sale by the
state of destination in 1940,79 it was plain that the balance
was being restored. These taxes, standing alone, are not
open to the reproach that they set up barriers to interstate
trade. Equality is their theme, as the court put it, and
equality of this kind is not a trade barrier. It remains to
be seen what the court will do when a given interstate transaction is sought to be taxed by two or more states. That
issue is still open. Two or more equalities may add up to a
burden and unconstitutionality or they may not.
One interesting point about this recent group of cases
that three justices do not believe that the court is a suiti,.
able agency of government to deal with problems of this
kind. Mr. Justice Black was the first to develop this point
of view8s but a more recent dissent shows that he has won
over Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Mr. Justice Douglas to this
idea.8 ' In his dissent in the Gwin, White & Prince case Mr.
Justice Black said that "only a comprehensive survey and
investigation of the entire national economy-which Congress
alone has power and facilities to make-can indicate the
need for, as well as justify, restricting the taxing power of
a State so as to provide against conjectured taxation by more
than one State on identical income."8' 2 It was said too that
no court can make such a broad legislative investigation. In
the joint dissent in the McCarroll case the same idea was
put in different words and judicial control of national commerce was likened to a "hit and miss method" that furnished
no "adequate basis for the creation of integrated national
rules which alone can afford that full protection for interstate commerce intended by the Constitution." 83 At another point it was said that the task of "striking a fair
7sHenneford v. Silas Mason Co., Inc., 300 U.S. 577 (1937).
79 McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33 (1940).
so See Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307 (1938) (dissenting opinion); Gwin, White & Prince v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434 (1939) (dissenting opinion).
81 See the joint dissent of these three in McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound
Lines, 309 U.S. 176, 183 (1940).
82See Gwin, White & Price v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434, 449 (1939)
(dissenting opinion).
83 See Note 81 supra, at 189.
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balance involves incalculable variants and therefore is beset
with perplexities."' 84
There is something very appealing about this point of
view. The justices with rare self-denial are seen handing
over the perplexities to Congress. We see that body engaged
in a nation-wide survey weighing perlexity against perplexity as it juggles the incalculable variants in its legislative
mind. Out of this, we are, assured, will come integrated national rules and thereafter all will be well for our national
economy. It is difficult to resist the appeal of a broad survey and the fat volumes that make up its record. It always seems so orderly and sure. Cast against it the judicial process, in spite of its marble columns and bulging
briefs, does seem hit and miss for it can never be moreon the record-than the case of A against B. The justices
have little control over the survey that makes up the record. They can never direct A to sue B in such a way as
to bring up a nice point that will round out the picture.
The justices must take a point when, as, and if it comes
before them. The judicial survey may span many decades
and the rules that evolve from it must be pieced together
from many decisions. There will be perplexities in the process of piecing and many will remain for good measure at
every stage.
So far Congress has stayed well away from playing any
part in the writing of rules whereby the validity of state
taxes may be determined. The joint dissent of the McCarroll
case is the most explicit invitation yet received. If two
more justices are won over to join in it at some future time,
then the power of the states to tax will undergo an abrupt
and far reaching change.
It is impossible in a discussion of this length to debate
the merits and implications of this proposal. It will be
enough to note a few points and queries. How far does the
invitation extend? It was expressed by the three justices in
a case involving a state gasoline tax as applied to an interstate bus but Mr. Justice Black extended it alone in two
earlier cases involving taxes on gross receipts as applied to
interstate businesses. Doubtless the two converts would
have joined in the earlier invitation. Does it extend, however, to multiple state taxation of interstate sales, to income,
841d.

at 184.
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inheritance and estate taxes, to capital stock and other corporate taxes, to property taxes as applied, for example, to
movables like railroad cars, to taxes on drummers and peddlers, to taxes applied before, during or after an interstate
movement of goods? Evidently the three justices approve
the continuance of the judicial swatting of state taxes that
discriminate against interstate commerce,85 but would they
stop swatting some or all of these other taxes when they
run afoul of judicial notions of interstate commerce or jurisdictional due process? The perplexities and incalculable
variants are still with us in the solution of these problems
and the judicial process works in the same hit and miss way.
The justices shed no light when they tell us that "This Court
has but a limited responsibility in that state legislation may
here be challanged if it discriminates against interstate
commerce (so much is clear enough) or is hostile to the congressional grant of authority." 86 It is this last phrase that
tells nothing, and the citation of the Berwind-White case is
meaningless. Assuming now that Congress has set forth on
its survey of one or more of these fields of state taxation
and after having assembled volumes of perplexities sets out
to do something, what may it do? May it, for example, declare that a state may not levy a tax that has therefore
been sustained against attack under the commerce or due
process clauses? An affirmative answer would, of course,
bestow on Congress a vast power over state taxation. It
might easily be that the political perplexities that operate in
Congress would see to it that no such answer was even hazarded in any legislative product that came from that body.
The power of a state to tax free from control by Congress is
after all a precious one and one not easily taken over. If
the answer is negative, then the field in which Congress
might operate is sharply limited.
We must leave this interesting subject here. It has
87
been dealt with in one aspect in two law review articles.
The ,fact that Congress has done nothing about these problems so far shows that Supreme Court policy has not, at
least, outraged Congress to the point of action. In the realm
85 Id.at 183.
86Id. at 184.
87Lowndes, State Taxation of Interstate Sales (1935) 7 Miss. L. J.223;

Perkins, The Sales Tax and Transactions in Interstate Commerce
(1934) 12 N. C. L. Rev. 99.
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of guessing it is unlikely that Congress will do anything
unless it is driven to it when the three justices become five.
The invitation of the three is apt to be declined with pleasure.
A special word should be said about two kinds of state
and local taxes that have been put on the carpet as trade
barriers. The first are those that apply to the drummer
and peddler of goods from out of state. Beginning with the
decision in Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District88 in
1887, the Supreme Court has consistently -invalidated fixedsum license taxes imposed on drummers engaged in taking
orders for goods to be shipped interstate even though the
taxes do not discriminate against such goods.89 The Robbins
case involved a drummer who took orders from local retailers
but in 1925 in Real Silk Hosiery Mills v. City of Portland0
the same result was reached where the drummer was taking
orders direct from the consumer. The Green River type
ordinance is simply a new way by which local merchants
are trying to protect their business against the inroads of
the direct seller. It remains to be seen what its fate will
be in the Supreme Court.9' The authority of the Robbins
case was recognized in the Berwind-White case.9 2 But when
it comes to peddlers the situation is different. If the license
tax discriminates against goods from out of state, then it
is invalid,93 but it will be sustained if it is non-discriminatory.9 4 It is easy to see how peddlers and drummers were
distinguished in terms of commerce clause doctrine, but in
terms of burdens on interstate merchandising it is not so
easy to see. The peddler today is typically the so-called
merchant trucker who peddles goods from out of state and
between possible taxes on him as a peddler and taxes on
88 120 U.S. 489 (1887).
89

Lockhart, The Sales Tax in Interstate Commerce, (1939) 52 Harv.
L. Rev. 617.
90 268 U.S. 325 (1925).

91 This type of ordinance declares it to be a criminal nuisance for a
solicitor to call at a residence without a previous invitation. The

whole subject is discussed in Jensen, Burdening Interstate Direct
Selling Under Claims of State Police Power (1940) 12 Rockey Mt.

L. Rev. 257.

92 McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33 (1940).

93 Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1876).
94 Emmert v. Missouri, 156 U.S. 296 (1895); Singer Sewing Machine Co.

v. Brickell, 233 U. S. 304 (1914); Wagner v. City of Covington,
251 U.S. 95 (1919).
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him as a trucker it is plain enough that his lot is not a
happy one. It is quite possible for state, county, and cityin combination or only one or more-to keep him out of
business entirely. The fact that most peddlers are peddling
goods from out of state makes no difference. Peddlers have
always been subject to a local retail sales tax. Since the
Berwind-White case the sales of drummers are subject to it
too, but in spite of this the drummer may still drum-unless
the Supreme Court sustains a Green River type ordinance
and puts him out of business in so far as he drums his trade
from consumers-but the peddler may be barred from peddling. It is hard to believe that the Supreme Court-particularly the present one---could be induced to say a good
word for the peddler in the name of equal protection or commerce clause and it is even harder to imagine that Congress
has the power, even if it has the will, to do anything if the
perplexities are passed over to it. So perhaps all we can
do is drop the subject with the wishful thinking of the Attorney General that "such petty barriers have long since
proved to be not only economically futile but also disastrous
to peace and good will. A realization of these facts by the
residents of each locality would make the choice of means to
level trade barriers relatively unimportant." 95 Perhaps the
day may come when our thousands of governing bodies will
feel that way about it but in the meantime the lot of the
peddler will continue to be a most unhappy one.
The other tax situation that calls for a special word is
the taxation of the interstate bus and truck. The Supreme
Court has for a long time and in a variety of decisions recognized that the state may exact compensation from the
interstate as well as from the intrastate bus and truck for its
use of the state highway. Thus, it has sustained a mileage
tax,6 a tax on gasoline used in interstate transportation
when the tax is levied on withdrawal from storage prior to
use 7 or on the local sale prior to use, 98 and it is more than
likely that it would today sustain a tax on use in interstate
or Speech of Attorney General Jackson supra Note 10, at 78.
06 Interstate Busses Corporation v. Blodgett, 276 U.S. 245 (1928).

Nashville C. & St. L. R.R. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249 (1933) ; Edelman
v. Boeing Air Transport, 289 U.S. 249 (1933).
9
3 Eastern Air Transport v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 285 U.S.
147 (1932).
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transportation."
The court has also sustained a variety of
flat fee licenses but only on a showing that the amount of
the fee has some relationship to the use or at least maintenance of the highways. The cases are as numerous as
the state statutes are varied and no detailed review is possible here.100 It is hard to believe that state treasurers have
any real cause to complain about the present state of affairs.
Plenty of ways are open to them to secure compensation for
the use of the highways of the state. The complaint is
coming from the interstate truck that makes only an occasional and limited use of the highways. The Supreme Court
has shaped its doctrine in such fashion that this truck may
be barred by the exaction of compensation that is too much
for a use that is too little.10° If this doctrine works in an
intolerable fashion it may well be that Congress will have
to step in. It might do so either under the commerce clause
or perhaps by conditioning its grants of money for the building of highways.
IV.
A brief word should be said about a miscellany of state
statutes that have been pointed to as examples of state parochialism. Thus, a state or local government may decree
by statute or regulation that it will buy only products produced by local producers or that it will employ only local
residents or citizens on its public works. This kind of preferential employment has been consistently sustained in the
Supreme Court10 2 and doubtless the same result would be
reached in a buy at home case. The notion underlying these
99

The court intimates as much in McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines,
309 U.S. 176 (1940). Cases that look the other way are readily
distinguishable. Thus, Helson v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 279
U.S. 245 (1929), which involved use of gasoline in running an interstate ferry may be put aside because use of the water was not the
same as use of a state built highway. Bingaman v. Golden Eagle
Western Lines, 297 U.S. 626 (1936) which involved use of gasoline
by an interstate bus may be put aside because the tax had there
been construed as not levied as compensation for use of the highways.
100 See Kauper, State Taxation of Interstate Motor Carriers (1933,
1934) 32 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 171, 351; Note (1938) 7 Geo. Wash. L.
Rev. 275; (1940) 8 id. 873.
101 See Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Georgia Public Service Commission, 295 U.S. 285, 289 (1935) where the court said, "The fee
is for the privilege of a use as extensive as the carrier wills that
it shall be.... One who receives a privilege without a limit is not
wronged by his own refusal to enjoy it as freely as he may."
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cases is that the state is the sole proprietor of its own public
works and governmental undertakings.
The same notion has been applied when the state seeks
to prefer its residents when it comes to what is called the
common property or resources of the state. Thus, a state
may restrict the planting of oysters in its streams to citizens
of the state, 10 3 forbid aliens from killing wild game, 0 4 forbid
the transportation beyond its borders of game lawfully
0
killed,°1
and of water from its streams. 08 An effort was
made to assimilate natural gas into this line of cases but
it failed when an Oklahoma statute that sought to prohibit
its export was invalidated0 7 and a like fate befell a West
Virginia statute that sought to give a preference to domestic
users. 0 8 Louisiana was rebuffed too when it sought to
build up its local shrimp canning industry by prohibiting
the export of unshelled shrimp 0 9 It remains to be seen
what will happen to the statutes now on the books that seek
to prohibit the export of, or give local preference to, hydroelectric energy generated from the waters of the state. 1 0
Congress has done something about the interstate movement of natural gas and electricity. In both the Natural
Gas Act of 1938 and the Federal Power Act of 1935 it has
written down on the statute books that these utilities shall
not "make or grant any undue preference tor advantage to
any person or subject any person to any undue prejudice
or disadvantage,"'
and these acts also contain provisions
empowering the commission to require the utilities to extend their facilities and furnish adequate service." 2 It re102 Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175 (1915); Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S.
207 (1903).
'03 McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1877).
Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138 (1914).
Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
101 Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908).
107 West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911).
"0105

10s Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923).
'09 Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1 (1928).
See ELSBREE, INTERSTATE TRANSMISSION OF ELECTRIC POWER (1931)
o10
9-57.
" See the Natural Gas Act, 52 STAT. 822 (1938), 15 U.S.C. §717 c (b)
(1939), and the same words appear in the Federal Power Act, 49
STAT. 851, 16 U.S.C. C §824 d (b) (Supp. 1939).
"12Natural Gas Act, 52 STAT. 822 (1938), 15 U.S.C. §717 f (1939)
Federal Power Act, STAT. 16 U.S.A. §824 f.
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mains to be seen whether these provisions will have any
bearing on the validity of state preference laws.
This very brief survey of the parts played by Court
and Congress in our federal system points to a few general
observations. By and large most of the state laws that are
pointed to as trade barriers are perfectly valid laws. That
means that the Supreme Court can be looked to to strike
down only the most obvious attempts to hit at interstate
commerce. One of the prices we pay for our federal system
is an abundance of laws coming from a multitude of legislative bodies. The states have rights and, what is more,
they are exercising them. Our national economy has had
to grow in this system. but its growth has never been bounded within politically drawn lines. Economic man has a way
of spreading all over the lot. In recent years government
has sought to play an ever greater part in the control of
this kind of man and with this the statute books bulge, the
pages of rules and regulations, like the guinea pigs, beget
more pages, and the public payrolls expand.
In this state of affairs the need for an umpire to call
fair or foul in clashes between state and state and state and
nation is more important than ever before. The object of
the discussion that has gone before was to show that both
Court and Congress have played important parts in this task.
In appraising the aptitudes of each it is noteworthy that
when Congress has done anything it has done it by passing
a tax or regulatory law of some kind. These laws might
involve taking over the field entirely to the exclusion of
state action on the particular subject or they might simply
add the federal law on top of existing state laws. In this
last case more often than not federal action stands as an
effort to fortify and complement well defined and pre-existing state policies within the limits of federal power under
the commerce clause. 11 Perhaps this kind of federal action
should not be called umpiring at all. It might well be said
that Congress was simply taking its part in the regulatory
game and that sometimes it was sending the state team to
the showers and playing the whole game itself while at other
times it was sending in only a pitcher or a few fielders or
113 This point is fully developed in a brilliant article by Professor

Strong, Cooperative Federalism (1938) 23 Iowa L. Rev. 459.
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a pinch hitter now and then or perhaps just sitting on the
bench. At any rate Congress so far has not distinguished
itself by undertaking to write well integrated rules to be
applied to umpire a state game in which it took no part.
The Supreme Court has always undertaken to say
whether state or nation or both should play in the game when
both clamor to play the whole game or perhaps just to play
shortstop. It has some rules for that. But when Congress
sits in the grandstand-silently-and won't play the court
has also undertaken to say whether the states may play at
all and, if so, it has different sets of rules for whatever
games the states may want to play. At least three justices
do not want the court to continue to do this and they would rout
the moody Congress out of the stands to do it-for someone
must do it. These justices evidently think that Congress
has some special aptitudes that the justices do not possess.
Perhaps it has but it will be a novel task and however well
or badly Congress does it the justices will never make good
their escape from this important responsibility for they will
still have to make the rules of Congress work.
When it comes to specific trade barriers it is always easy
to say that Congress ought to take over the regulatory task
and produce the desired uniformity. It has often done so
and no doubt will continue to do so. Events are more likely
to shape the fields of state and nation in the tasks of government than are the outcries for and against the powers
of each. The Supreme Court is exposed to events and outcries alike and it is often in a position where it can do little
to shape the course of state and nation. Thus, in South,
Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros.114 it was

tolerant of state action as to weight and width limitations
as applied to interstate trucks. The intolerable consequences
that may flow from this may call on Congress to take some

action.

If the decision had gone the other way different

consequences might easily have called for like federal action.

Federal control followed soon after Baldwin v. Seelig 15 had
frustrated state action. A different decision might just as
easily have produced such conflicts in state control that
federal action would have come nearly as quickly. It is hard
114303 U.S. 177 (1938).
116294 U.S. 511 (1935).
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to believe too that the Wabash decision-,a in 1886 would have
postponed federal control of interstate railroad rates for
very many years if it had gone the other way. So it goes.
In cases such as these where control by some government
is an insistent demand the Supreme Court must play a subordinate role as umpire between state and nation. It is for
this reason that the preference expressed in the Barnwell
case for legislative action need cause no real concern.
In the case of state taxes, however, the situation seems
quite different. The Supreme Court has gone on its own
for a long time and its decisions have covered nearly every
kind of state tax. Neither events nor outcries have moved
Congress to action. At no time in this or any other field
of action need Congress sit back and await a judicial invitation to act. If the rules worked out by Supreme Court
decisions over many years had produced intolerable consequences Congress could have tried its legislative hand at
any time and it still can even if the justices who join in the
invitation never number more than three. It is for this
reason that the action of the three seems unwise. The task
is difficult enough no matter what agency of government
tries to do something about it. The task is shared now in
the sense that Congress may at any time step in and try
its hand if the Supreme Court produces intolerable policies.
The three justices would try to take the court out of the
game entirely. It is hard to see any good reason for doing
this. The hit and miss methods of the justices have not
as yet, at least, produced such results that Congress has been
driven to action. If that time comes Congress is free to
go to work and it need not await any, invitation from the
Court.
116Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886).

